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Dieppe Revisted 
John P. Campbell. Dieppe Revisited: A 
Documentary Investigation (London: 
Frank Cass. 1993) 24 7 pages. £30. 
"A nother book about Dieppe?" 
This is the question 
everyone will wonder since the 
tragic 1942 Dieppe raid has been 
examined so often previously. It is 
also the title of Professor 
Campbell's first chapter. The aim 
of his work is to analyse the raid's 
operational aspects, such as 
intelligence, radar, deception, 
naval and air operations, in the 
context of activities in the English 
Channel as a whole in 1942. He 
uses mainly Allied and German 
unpublished primary sources, 
many of the latter hitherto unused 
war diaries and after action 
reports, although all previously 
available for many years to the 
public. In doing so Campbell 
demonstrates his knowledge of the 
period by pointing out gaps in the 
documentary record resulting 
from loss, destruction or 
continued classification. The 
Dieppe raid, he explains, "was 
simply the obvious peg on which 
to hang such an investigation." 
This investigation examines all 
the myths and misconceptions that 
usually flourish as a result of a 
military failure such as at Dieppe. 
Campbell puts these in their 
operational context and attempts 
to explain or, more often, disprove 
each scenario to the reader, acting 
like a detective I historian. 
Although this reviewer usually 
agrees with his conclusions, 
Campbell does not always address 
all the issues fully, and the process 
he takes the reader through is 
often extremely confusing. 
The most commonly-held myth 
about the operation is that it did 
not achieve surprise and that the 
Germans received forewarning, 
resulting in the massacre on the 
beaches. All the investigations into 
the possibility that some kind of 
agent report gave forewarning are 
not merely inconclusive. They are 
pointless because they do not 
establish a link between any leak 
and the massacre on the beaches. 
They assume that the leak was 
listened to and that this explains 
the disaster but this ignores the fact 
that the Dieppe garrison was not at 
alert readiness. 
Campbell takes the reader 
through a very difficult process of 
canvassing each of the many 
supposed reports received by the 
Abwehr, the German intelligence 
service, only to discount each one 
in the end. One agent, code-named 
Tate, was controlled by the XX or 
Twenty Committee, the organisation 
responsible for running double 
agents usually for misinformation 
purposes. Campbell asks could 
Tate have been allowed to send a 
warning in order to build up the 
credibility of XX agents with the 
Abwehr? Campbell adds that Tate 
would not have been useful in this 
role since, as opposed to the 
controlled agents reporting to 
Madrid and Lisbon, his traffic 
passed by landline between 
Hamburg and Berlin, and therefore 
could not be intercepted and 
deciphered by the Government 
Code and Cipher School (GC and 
CS). Here Campbell errs. GC and 
CS was not interested in what Tate 
sent since they already knew what 
it was. At the very least they had 
some input into all of his reports 
and sometimes even compiled 
them. They were interested in the 
German reaction to his reports 
which they could read through 
Ultra decrypts. This complicated 
story is confused further by the oft 
quoted agent report, T 1022 1677 
of 29 October 1942. This he 
unfortunately refers to under 
several different dates. 
Could Ultra could be relied on 
to warn that the Germans had 
advance knowledge of the raid? 
Although he does not directly 
answer, undoubtedly it is yes. The 
Naval Section of the GC and CS 
read all German naval signals 
intelligence in the Channel and this, 
as Campbell himself says, provided 
"a ready check on the occasions 
when the German defensive 
machine reacted to the threat of an 
Allied operation." 
On the question of German 
foreknowledge Campbell concludes 
that with all the Allied and German 
documents available, it is obvious 
that the Germans received no 
warning and were surprised. If any 
reports were received before the 
raid, they were either not passed 
on to the local garrison or ignored 
by the respective authorities in 
Berlin. This is shown by the fact 
that after receiving reports in May, 
June and July of an intended 
landing the Germans sounded the 
alarm dozens of times, at many 
places along the coast from Norway 
to France, but did not do so for the 
18/19 August in the Dieppe area. 
The bulk of two long-range bomber 
groups, the only torpedo bomber 
unit in the Luftwaffe and an E-boat 
unit, the latter two extremely 
effective in the anti-raid role, were 
also moved away from the 
operational area before the raid. 
Campbell gives a good analysis 
of the strategic context in which 
Jubilee was decided on and 
effectively impresses on the reader 
the atmosphere of semi-crisis 
prevailing at that time in Combined 
Operations Headquarters (COHQ). 
He contends that revival of the 
cancelled operation took place "at 
a highly secret meeting on 11 July," 
although his only evidence is the 
very dubious post-war memoirs of 
Hughes-Hallett, COHQ Naval 
Advisor at the time. 
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Campbell correctly states that 
deception, using the XX 
organisation, was not being 
practised actively until the end of 
September 1942 but does not 
explain why. The reason was that 
the security authorities were not 
fully convinced that all German 
agents in the United Kingdom were 
under control. Campbell also 
states: "That the raid might have 
been somehow saved by a cover 
plan remains doubtful, as will be 
argued later." Unfortunately, he 
never addresses the point again. 
He asserts that Sir John 
Masterman "regretted" Jubilee had 
not been properly covered, which 
meant using the XX system to gain 
surprise, by referring to an earlier 
quote by Masterman that: "It is sad, 
but interesting, to speculate 
whether the Dieppe raid might have 
been more successful. or at least 
less costly, if it had been effectively 
covered." This is not "regret" on 
Masterman's part but actually pure, 
worthless speculation. It is 
pointless regretting or speculating 
whether Jubilee might have been 
more successful if covered using the 
XX organisation, since Jubilee 
gained surprise without it. When 
Masterman asks whether it would 
have been "less costly," he is 
assuming that Jubilee might not 
have been defeated if the German 
strategic reserves had not been 
redeployed. Campbell does not 
comment on this, possibly because 
it is an irrelevant question, 
although the answer is defmitely no. 
The operation was defeated by the 
static coastal defence forces, no 
strategic reserves were involved, the 
latter being the only units that 
would have been affected by any 
cover or deception operation. 
Besides the strategic reserves 
would have taken too long to get 
into action to be of significance to 
operations of such short duration 
as Jubilee. Campbell raises the 
point that the collision of Jubilee 
with a German coastal convoy 
actually proved to be a "stroke of 
good fortune" since it "provided a 
form of cover." The German radar 
operators ignored the radar plots 
ll8 
of Jubilee since they had a convoy 
of their own in the area. This would 
have been the case, though, even if 
Jubilee had not collided with the 
convoy. Here Campbell is using 
confusing language for it was the 
presence of the German convoy that 
deflected the German operators 
from their important radar plots, 
not the convoy's collision with 
Jubilee. Actually, the collision was 
a stroke of misfortune because the 
German defenders of Puys who, 
Campbell correctly states, had been 
on a night exercise, "did not stand 
down before dawn because of the 
gunfire at sea." 
Whether this convoy was 
picked up by British shore radar 
stations is a matter of on going 
debate and Campbell still has not 
clarified it. He also does not 
adequately explain the difference in 
timings between the various 
warning signals supposedly sent to 
Jubilee. He records Hughes-Hallett 
and apparently the Admiralty, 
through Mountbatten, as asserting 
that the inshore convoy was never 
plotted by shore radar Although 
Campbell says this was 
"misleading" he does not critically 
comment further. He also ignores 
the fact that the Admiralty report 
contradicts the above assertion: 
"The enemy was, however, located 
by shore radar stations, and was 
plotted by Portsmouth .... " 
An interesting revelation is that 
the move of the 10 Panzer Division 
from Scissons to Amiens, within 
striking distance of Dieppe, was 
actually known by British 
intelligence in June, earlier than the 
13 July quoted in the wartime 
official history of British 
intelligence. Campbell proves that 
the movement of this division 
earlier was the main reason for the 
initial Rutter plan being changed on 
5 July from a two-tide to a one tide 
operation. The final chapter 
examines the controversy over the 
relationship between Jubilee and 
the successful Normandy landings 
almost two years later. All the 
supposed lessons learned are 
examined in the light of historical 
evidence and rarely is there more 
than a bare mention of Dieppe. 
One of the main reasons according 
to Campbell is the long time gap 
between the two operations, and 
that many other large-scale 
landings, such as in North Mrica, 
Sicily, Italy and the Pacific Islands, 
happened in between for the raid 
to have contributed much to future 
invasion planning. Campbell also 
shows that by 1944 the Germans 
would have fortified all the Channel 
ports anyway, as a matter of 
strategic principal and because of 
their experiences in Italy. Also for 
certain is that D-Day would have 
occurred in 1944 without Jubilee. 
Campbell does admit to lessons 
learned at the sharp end, one 
example being the impetus given to 
development of the Armoured 
Vehicle Royal Engineers. 
Looking at the book as a whole, 
although the research has been 
meticulous and the conclusions, 
when reached, are accurate, the 
presentation is unfortunately 
lacking. Overall it is very 
haphazard, confusing and 
complicated to follow. Leaving these 
criticisms aside, the book is 
recommended to anyone who is 
interested in the Dieppe raid or the 
Normandy landings, and no doubt 
it will become a standard work. 
Hugh G. Henry 
St. John's College, Cambridge 
* * * * * 
The Unknown Navy 
Canada's World War II 
Merchant Navy 
Robert G. Halford, The Unknown Navy: 
Canada's World War II Merchant Navy 
(St. Cathartnes, ON: Vanwell Publishing, 
1995) 288 pages, $29.95, (ISBN 1-
55125-016-0) 
I t is with good reason that a recent book on the Canadian Merchant 
Navy, written by Robert G. Halford, 
has been titled The Unknown 
Navy: Canada's World War II 
Merchant Navy. One of the keys to 
the survival of Britain during the 
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